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COMMUNITY AND SCHOOLS: A PROLEGOMENON

The school-community relation is a recurring theme in educational thought, though surely not a continuing one. Dewey stressed it in 1900, in *School and Society*, and returned to it in 1916 in *Democracy and Education*. It was focal in the 1930s in the thought of the Social Reconstructionists. But Joseph Hart sought with little success to restore it to prominence in 1951.[1] Then, in 1967, Fred Newmann and Donald Oliver offered a thoughtful, still-cited analysis of discussions of community and of the educational bearings of such concerns.[2] I believe another examination is due, and I intend this paper as its beginnings. I shall be seeking primarily just to identify the challenge and sketch a strategy schools might adopt in response.

It seems particularly appropriate to launch this examination here because of a number of philosophers of education have appeared to avoid it. My suspicion is that many do so out of the liberal concerns that have helped *generate* the problem of community. Many philosophers of education have accepted the classical liberal's fear of the domination of the collectivity, and have been concerned with the cultivation of freedom, reason, and autonomy as ways to gain distance and independence from community. They have taken the two interests as mutually exclusive and chosen freedom in preference to community.

I am convinced we must look again. Certainly a great deal of contemporary work suggests that to be the case and urges the importance of redesigning community for our time. This seems a theme cutting across specialties and concerns, so that one encounters it in the work of

contemporary philosophers as diverse as Alasdair MacIntyre,[3] Michael Sandel,[4] William Sullivan,[5] and Michael Ignatieff;[6] in sociologists such as Robert Bellah and his co-authors of *Habits of the Heart*;[7] in Postmodernists such as Richard Falk[8] and Roberto Unger;[9] in political theorists like Benjamin Barber;[10] and among philosophers of education, recently including Tom Green,[11] Betty Sichel,[12] Madhu Prakash,[13] and Victor Worsfold.[14] But this paper deals with such work only tangentially. It is primarily an attempt to frame the problem of community, and how schools might address it, in my own terms.

I have for some months now been steeping myself in the literature of community. It is an extensive literature, and a study of community shades off into discussions of a number of near relations (such as fraternity and loyalty) and vital connections that demand pursuit (such as pluralism). Moreover, what are seen as antonyums (such as alienation and authority) also require attention. Each of these, of course, has a literature of its own.

The various specialties and perspectives yield a number of somewhat different conceptions of the nature of community. Despite the several concept analyses that have been done,[15] there would surely have been room for another; but after beginning that, I realized I would have to forgo it if there were to be any pages left for the questions that primarily concern me. Thus, I will simply list the elements and qualities attributed to community by authors I have read. I have neither counted frequencies nor assessed these attributes for their logical order and compatability, but I have tried to sequence elements here so as to exhibit first the conditions of community, then the effects on individuals attributed to them, and finally the results alleged to ensue from community membership.

According to the analysts of community -- including philosophers, theologians, and four or five kinds of social scientists -- the constitutive features of community include the following: interaction and mutual dependence; the intention of longevity and permanence; expressive ties; communication; common and mutual sentiments; shared beliefs; and an ethic of individual concern and sympathy. The impacts of these conditions on members are said to include: the shaping of individual identity; an acceptance of group standards and a desire to abide by them; commitment; a sense of place; and identification with the group, along with a sense of consciousness of kind. The result of these impacts is likely to be: a sense of solidarity and mutual support, and, according to the relatively few critics who write of community, some degree of group exclusivity and aggressiveness. It is apparent, then, that community is seen to perform functions important both to the individual and to society. It contributes to personality development and integration, and to social cohesion and stability.

Yet there is considerable testimony that these qualities are currently missing from our lives. And not surprisingly, there is widespread agreement that their absence represents a significant loss. "The quest for community," as sociologist Robert Nisbet put it, has been "the dominant social tendency of the 20th century."[16] According to political theorist Sheldon Wolin, restating the value of community has been the major preoccupation of the political thought of both the 19th and the 20th centuries.[17] And political thinker John Schaar labelled the search for community "the modern mal du siecle" -- simultaneously a ceaseless and a futile quest.[18] Meanwhile, from another tradition, Existentialist philosopher Albert Levi has argued that the absence of community, and the alienation generated by that condition, represents

"the essential evaluative concept for personal orientation and social criticism in the modern world."[19]

On the matter of whether and what kind of community now obtains, I shall do no more than quote a single author. She is a sociologist who has done the most extensive job I found on trying to locate and examine the nature of community in the form in which it currently occurs. In her book, *Contemporary Community: Sociological Illusion or Reality?*,[20] she acknowledges that the traditional associations of the past simply cannot exist under the circumstances in which most of us live. There are in their stead, however, patterns of communal association that take the form of "social networks":[21]

> Each person develops a unique and personal network reflecting the sum total of his private choices and his own social characteristics. Because many of us are affected by the same social factors, e.g. class, occupation, age, or culture, it is likely that there are many overlaps between social networks among different groups. *At these intersections, or the linking points between different persons, one can diagram a community structure.*

But author Jacqueline Scherer also has this to say about these communal associations:

> The communal forms...[of today]...have little of the historical stability of earlier communities. They seem ephemeral, constantly changing, and so temporary as to appear insignificant... my communities aren't as permanent as those of my parents. I'm not at all certain that my community of today will be the same as that of next year, and I'm almost certain that the community of my children will be different from mine in the future.

The junctures of the networks at which "one can diagram a community structure" appear, then, fairly insubstantial points on which to pin much hope for fulfilling the individual and societal functions of traditional communities. Thus there has been considerable effort to generate and develop it in other places and situations. Particularly has it been asked whether any of those numerous "voluntary associations" de Tocqueville found so prevalent among Americans could not be strengthened to serve the purposes of individual rootedness and of societal cohesion. Thus we have sought to find or build community in churches, among trade groups and professions, in settlement houses, social clubs, block associations and other neighborhood groups, in communes, and in corporations. We have also sought at least to simulate it in more temporary associations such as T-Groups and encounter groups of various types. For a variety of reasons, it appears unlikely that any of these efforts will be generally adopted as the answer to our need for community. And meanwhile, youngsters continue to arrive in school without having experienced very much of it.

If those who have made the psychological case for the importance of community are right -- Fromm,[22] Erikson,[23] Maslow,[24] Bronfenbrenner[25] among others -- its absence has a profound effect on youngsters and on schools. The young are left with a lot of needs that had previously been otherwise satisfied when they came to school, and they place schools in the position of finding it difficult to accomplish things that were a lot easier under the earlier circumstances. These difficulties attach particularly, although certainly not exclusively, to the sorts of aims we commonly associate with civic education. Under the conditions of traditional communities, youngsters could be expected to arrive in

school with a more substantial and permanent set of relationships, a firmer and more rooted sense of self, at least the beginning internalization of a set of group standards, and the rudiments of shared beliefs, sentiments and commitment. The task of the school was to supplement this incipient 'personhood' with knowledge and skills, as well as with particular attitudes and values that might not inhere within their immediate communities.

In fact, the challenge civic education confronted under these circumstances was that of building a national community in the face of numerous small, often tightly-knit communities. As the Civil War dramatized -- and as the educator resoluteness toward the immigrants of the early 20th century assumed -- smaller group loyalties could impede the development of national affiliation. Thus, the job of the school was perceived as somehow dissolving or attenuating the hold of the smaller, more parochial affiliation, and attaching individuals instead to the nation. What was called for was a civic education that would bring commonality, sharing, and attachment to a broader group. And this was taken to be at least in part a matter of dissolving existing bonds (Horace Kallen to the contrary notwithstanding)[26] in order to make others possible. Possibly "dissolving" is the wrong metaphor. But if not a matter of loosening or replacing existing bonds, the task was taken as supplementing them. In any event, what is central to this discussion is that those to be educated were seen to *have* attachments. Today's challenge may be to create them when there have been none -- or when they have been at best weak and transitory.

That challenge is quite different from the earlier one, and I think we will have to recognize that if our civic education is to be successful. The point from which our efforts must begin is not that existing ties need

loosening. It is that bonds must be developed where there are few. I want to try in several ways to establish this claim before moving on to the matter of how schools can and should contribute to the generation of community within society.

The first thing I want to cite is the prizewinning film of a year or two ago, "Platoon." It was an enormously tragic and compelling portrayal of the fighting in Vietnam, and it displayed the atrocities perpetrated by our men, as well as the horrors inspiring their behavior. Yet for me the most chilling thing about the film was not what our soldiers did to the Vietnamese but what they did to each other. It revealed minimal fellow-feeling among Platoon members under conditions which according to earlier generations inspired the epitome of identification and compassion. Yet even under these most brutal of human circumstances -- when the Hobbesian drive for mutual protection might be strongest -- there was insufficient bonding among the men of the Platoon to yield much mutual support among them, or even to keep them from killing each other.

Sociologists claim that individuals become socialized through four kinds of attachments or bonds: through ties to individuals; commitment to general lines of action or goals; involvement and participation in certain types of activities; and belief in the moral validity of social rules.[27] These four basic types of attachment are thought to serve as the conduits through which other, more specific socialization takes place. If any of these four broad attachments is weak or missing, however, socialization may remain limited. It would appear that for the men of the film's Platoon, at least two and perhaps more of the four were missing.

Two non-fictional cases of the last several years continue to haunt me. They concern a somewhat different kind of tie and attest to the school's inability to inspire bonds of a rather different sort. The first is

a situation that arose in Chicago. It involved a young Hispanic high school student who, with a highly supportive coach's help, had become an Olympic-class diver. He seemed to have it made out of poverty and the ghetto, and he appeared one of those great stories schools could cite as proof that with opportunity, even the most disadvantaged can triumph. The Horatio Alger bubble burst when a police investigation found that throughout this period, the young man was also not only a member of a gang sought on a number of criminal charges -- but that he was gang executioner and had evidently committed multiple murders.

The second case occurred in New York. There, a young Harlem resident and his brother decided one summer afternoon to go to the movies. Not having ticket money, they stopped by Central Park to mug someone to get it. The man they picked was a decoy policeman who shot and killed the younger boy. He had just finished Philips Exeter -- attended on scholarship -- and would have left days later for Stanford, where he also had a scholarship. The older brother was at Cornell, also on scholarship.

For our purposes, the sad thing about both stories -- apart from the personal tragedies and the waste -- is that their schools had been unable to tie these three boys any more successfully to school and social norms. And a part of what makes their stories so dramatic is that these young men had not only conformed to school norms -- they had seemingly adopted them for themselves and succeeded so well at just what the school represented and sought of its students.

Tom Green suggests a language for talking about the problem, in his discussion of weak or instrumental normation.[28] It is the situation in which "the school gets the conformity it needs," but in which the individual is "in the school, but not of it." Certainly this seems to have been the case with these three boys. There was enough of a bond that they

learned and abided by school norms; but they obviously had not internalized them in the sense of making them part of themselves. The boys, Tom suggests, remained unwilling to cede the school any legitimate moral authority over them, and as a result the moral and civic education that the school could accomplish was minimal. The schools these boys attended -- some of our best -- evidently had had minimal effects on their characters, and probably even less on their personalities. "Moral education," asserts Tom, "is education in strong normation. It is the education of a conscience that is cultivated by attachment to a social group."[29]

I suspect that the reason for a great deal of our failure in civic education lies precisely here. Following Tom's suggestion, we might consider three degrees of normation: the strong normation that is the model, where the internalization of school norms makes the values and beliefs taught -- including a commitment to the importance of learning -- a part of the individual's own attitude structure; the weak normation situation in which the student acquires an awareness and intellectual understanding of school expectations, but does not internalize them; and the minimal or no normation situation represented by students whom the school seems hardly to reach at all. By reason of indifference or more active hostility, those marked by minimal normation never arrive at even superficial conformity or deference to school norms. I suspect this is the situation with large numbers of those we call disadvantaged -- urban minorities, children of poverty -- and it is probably the case also with a number of those youngsters we have found "disruptive" and then labelled "hyperactive" or "emotionally disabled." If this is so, the situation not only involves large numbers achieving minimal normation at best (perhaps a third of our students); but the normation youngsters receive

-- hence, the civic and moral education accomplished in schools -- is strongly correlated with race and socio-economic status. The ground conditions for civic education are simply not there for some groups.

But the problem is broader. In light of what ethnographers tell us about the 'disengagement' of youngsters from schools, that would appear to be the situation with quite a substantial number of today's adolescents, and not just with the disadvantaged. The language of weak or minimal normation might also cover a number of other students as well. For instance, it seems a good way to get a deeper understanding of the two attractive adolescents who squired Ted Sizer around the suburban high school he describes in *Horace's Compromise*. Sizer's sharpest criticism is aimed at Will, who he found guilty of "intellectual softness" giving rise to inexcusably "sloppy responses to...simple questions."[30] Perhaps a better account is that neither Sizer nor the school ever really managed to get Will's attention. School, and the school's mission, just never made it onto the personal agenda that Will pursues, or into the lived experience that constitutes his world. As Coleman might put it, Will just doesn't bring his psyche to school.[31] This makes it quite plausible that he and his classmates have arrived only at the instrumental normation Tom calls "weak." They do their homework, attend classes with fair regularity, address teachers politely -- but to a considerable extent remain beyond the school's mission of transforming their understanding and at least some of their sentiments and dispositions.

I am convinced Tom is right in suggesting that ultimately this is a matter of bonding -- to individuals and to what the school stands for as an institution -- and that our schools are simply not managing to generate such ties. At least some of those dealing with disadvantaged and marginal students acknowledge that this is the fundamental challenge in

succeeding with this group.[32] But we seem unaware of its import for other students as well -- despite the staggering suggestion of Michael Sedlak and his colleagues a year or two ago that "the disengaged population ... probably exceeds two-thirds of the total number of high school students nationwide." *Selling Students Short* opens with the assertion that "Virtually all adolescents, especially middle class youth, have progressively disengaged themselves from high school..."[33]

I suspect it is true. But why now? Were earlier students more tied to schools than are those of today? The accounts we have of 19th century schools and of students' responses to them make this seem unlikely. The descriptions typically portray a rather bleak and severe environment unlikely to elicit bonding and a sense of community. But there *was* a surrounding environment in which youngsters experienced these things, and the school was embedded within it. That environment, with the significant others who constituted it, often saw learning as important and a youngster's behavior in school as an important dimension of his or her developing character.

Moreover, school was for many youngsters just one of the multiple contexts in which they interacted with fellow students. Thus, even though school itself may have failed to inspire the personal and institutional bonds important to holding on to students, bonds generated elsewhere may well have played an important part in doing so. In his most recent book, James Coleman has argued that the superiority of Catholic schools to other private schools, and to public schools, lies precisely in the fact that the parishes from which the students come represent perhaps the last vestige of traditional community in urban areas. They are functional communities offering multiple sets of overlapping relationships and intergenerational ties.[34] Otherwise, as communities have weakened and

disappeared, the external support they once lent to school affiliation has waned, and a school's holding power has come to depend more and more on the quality of life within the school, and its attractiveness. As John Goodlad has put it, "The most important thing about school for the children and youth who go there is the living out of their daily personal and social lives..."[35]

I want to argue that it makes particular sense today to see the school's problems in terms of the need for making the school *itself* a strong and unified modern community. This seems desirable due to the absence of community elsewhere, and the human needs that apparently are not being met in any other way. I want to argue, in other words, that a society with such gaps makes necessary certain adaptations in the school. These adaptations are indicated not only as an appropriate *new* aim for schools -- a much needed contribution to the development and maturation of the young; but they are also necessary as a means essential to the realization of existing school aims -- to enabling the school to make even its *traditional* contribution, under current circumstances.

But Coleman's emphasis on the community outside the school, and on its relation to the school, suggests a somewhat different possibility. If community is so difficult to find in modern life, and so much to be desired, is it possible that schools might create or assemble communities -- literally summon them into being -- by articulating some sort of educational ideal and inviting likeminded parents to join in it? Such a possibility is one of the things that I find most attractive about the idea of establishing public schools of choice. And the importance now attributed to consensus and coherence as factors determinative of school success renders such a possibility doubly attractive.

We know that modern living leaves community for individuals to

fashion for themselves, out of their choices with respect to relationships. Whether one subscribes to Jacqueline Scherer's "network of personal associations" view of community as earlier quoted, or whether one's view is otherwise oriented, the mobility of our society makes one's community a matter of personal choice. There seems no reason why schools cannot be designed to represent coherent persuasions that ultimately might enable them to function as reference groups for the adults as well as the youngsters affiliated with each school.

A school that began with the initial advantage that its constituents had selected it could, by virtue of that, possess the capacity and the groundwork for community. Gerald Grant suggests that ultimately what attracts families to a school they select is the character ideal it enunciates and reflects.[36] What one holds as such an ideal surely has enough salience for an individual, and represents a sufficiently extensive number of beliefs and values, that its sharing might suffice as the ground upon which to build community. In this way, schools might conceivably come to represent communities for the parents affiliated with them, as well as for their students.

A slightly more modest proposal was offered by John Dewey who in different times envisioned a somewhat different school and community relation. He saw the relation in terms of what schools might do to simultaneously prepare youngsters for adulthood, and equip and dispose them to improving collective existence. In the interests of both education and societal reform, he adovcated that schools constitute themselves as "miniature communities." The idea was that in the course of undertaking collaborative endeavor, youngsters could experience the processes that define adult society, as relieved of economic incentives and thus purified. At first in rudimentary form, and then in increasingly sophisticated

versions, the young might actually create organizational structures and participate in the processes and activities sustaining them. Study and refinement of these structures and processes were to yield understanding of the adult society and the wherewithal for improving it.

Somewhere short of realization, the idea was derailed. Today there are good reasons for returning to it. One of them is that schools seem to have a better chance at creating community than do other possibilities that have been explored for the contemporary world. Of the necessary requisites of community, two pose particular difficulty under the life conditions of most of us. These are the requirements of space and time. Community analysts ever since Tonnies have stressed the importance of a shared space and the propinquity to permit extensive interaction in multiple connections. Schools could approach this requirement since their constituents do share the same space for the bulk of each day. As to the time conditions, although few schools enroll successive generations of youngsters from the same families, they do represent multi-year connections for most of their students. Thus, they can perhaps represent a lot more permanence and continuity for the individual than Scherer's "intersections of association."

Other good reasons for returning to the idea of making schools communities consist not only in the sorts of evidence to which I have alluded, but in the recent research on the determinants of school success. Both Effective Schools research and private school inquiry suggest that the difference between a successful school and one that is less so is largely a matter of the extent to which it manages to become a community. Although this is more typically cast in the language of school "ethos" or "climate," rather than that of "community," ethos is defined as "what people in a community share that makes them a community rather than a

group of disparate individuals. It is the configuration of attitudes, values, and beliefs that members of the community share."[37] Hence, where this sharing is extensive and significant, there is community among those within a school.

I have seen such community fairly often in schools of choice. In fact, many of them make it the object of deliberate, self-conscious activitites explicitly identified as "community-building" in intent. There is typically an emphasis on relationships within the school -- student-to-student as well as student-to-teacher relationships -- and it is immediately apparent that the school's interest is in human beings, as opposed to role occupants of the student role. Such an orientation may explain youngsters' insistence that teachers in these schools "care," while teachers in other schools do not. Students respond to these circumstances in two ways particularly germane to this discussion. They acquire a strong sense of affiliation with others in the school -- leading many to liken such schools to a "family" and others to speak in terms more reminiscent of a membership one has enthusiastically assumed. The second type of effect is a difference in the student's orientation toward school purposes and activitites. There is virtually always a difference in school-related attitudes and behavior, including academic orientation. What these two effects exhibit, then, is bonding to school-associated individuals and to the school's institutional norms. Such differences are quite pronounced in many alternative schools, and they make a substantial contribution to the quality of education as well as in the quality of school life. I think that an effort to establish such schools more widely would address the problem of community, as well as a number of the more distinctively academic problems that continue to plague us.

My time is nearly up. But if this statement is to be taken seriously,

there remain three items which must receive at least mention, even in a prolegomenon. All are associated with the problem of parochialism. First, I have said nothing about the challenge we must confront once successful at building communities in schools. If my assertions are correct, then we suffer from the absence of community and from weak and tenuous bonding. Were we to resolve that problem with schools that represent successful communities, then how do we stimulate the wider bonding that transfers and continues these benefits beyond school walls, and which is the challenge of civic education? In the terms in which Buber posed it, how do we educate for a genuine "community of communities"?[38]

Any former social studies teacher must see that as a serious challenge. Certainly it must become a part of the civic education curriculum. And I don't think we can count on the somewhat mystical hopes of ever-widening circles, or on the automatic extension of fairly particular and immediate bonds, to people and institutions at increasing remove. The school must deliberately seek to bond youngsters to people and institutions outside the school. Uri Bronfenbrenner talks about the importance of a "curriculum of caring" which, he stresses, must be a matter of doing, not just of studying.[39] Two kinds of school activities have been particularly useful in this regard. One is the cultural journalism programs that have had students interviewing local adults. Eliot Wigginton's students formed lasting ties to Aunt Airy and other residents of the mountain community with whom they have interacted. Foxfire builds intergenerational and community ties. And a similar program in Iowa has had students questioning Vietnam veterans on their feelings about the war, and the parents of severely handicapped youngsters about what their lives are like. Such experiences have high potential for building empathy with others outside the school and bonding students to

individuals and groups.

The other kind of program that is particularly useful in this regard is service learning. Carefully planned, sustained, and examined volunteer activity can build strong ties. I am thinking, for instance, about the 'grandchild' programs in which youngsters assume longterm responsibilities in relation to particular senior citizens. Or to programs like the consumer action service run by high school students who help wronged purchasers obtain fair treatment. Or to programs that have youngsters tutoring the handicapped, both younger and older than themselves. As genuine contributions to others, such programs establish empathy and bonds to individuals and groups beyond the school. They can simultaneously contribute to rebuilding the "civic virtue" or "republican tradition" whose absence MacIntyre and Bellah associate with the absence of community.

A second concern that must be addressed even in such a preliminary examination as this has been has to do with the *sort* of communities schools should become. Certainly not all communities are good, and a school community like any other must meet certain criteria if it is not to resemble what Erving Goffman identified as a "total institution," instead of a desirable community. Jonestown, or the ward of Ken Casey's "One Flew Over the Cookoo's Nest" surely represent communities all of us would want to reject. I would also have extensive misgivings about a community like that of the fundamentalist school described by Alan Peshkin in *God's Choice*.[40] But there have been several convincing efforts now at distinguishing desirable from undesirable forms of communal organization. Tom Green and Jim McClellan offered some beginnings along those lines years ago,[41] as has S. I. Benn.[42] More recently, Newmann and Oliver named a list of criterial attributes for positive communities,[43] and so has

Betty Sichel.[44] Surely anyone interested in community must confront the question of what kinds of community take seriously the concerns that have made philosophical liberalism so wary. I do not intend to suggest that some balance must be struck between two poles, between freedom and autonomy at one end of a continuum and community at the other. I suspect that real resolution of that dilemma must await the long needed reformulation of liberalism now under way. I find some hope in the Postmodernists' insistence that our dualisms and resulting antinomies must be recast if we are to get beyond the place at which we have for some time been stalled -- at increasing cost. But in the meantime, any responsible search for community must at least examine itself in terms of the challenges with which liberalism would confront it.

Finally, for all of us raised in the liberal tradition, no matter how serious the absence of community, education cannot be left to consist solely in socialization. Thus I see the bonding I have referred to as but a preliminary step in the educative process -- a necessary condition that all too often goes unsatisfied today, but far from a sufficient one. As others have insisted, there can be no neutrality with respect to moral education, or postponement until the child is old enough to make her own choices. Socialization begins long before the age of reason. But education must provide the wherewithal for self-conscious examination of socialization's consequences. The context need not be a situation explicitly encouraging students to affirm or repudiate what they have previously internalized. But education must involve "developing a conceptual basis for a discourse that allows us to consider the full interrelatedness of individual and community."[45] This could at the same time yield both the language necessary for consideration of the public good and the capacity to reflect upon it -- both of which are important to the sustenance of democratic

community, and both of which MacIntyre and Bellah find lacking. I think the work of Chet Bowers offers the best guidance currently available on how to accomplish this. To so suggest is a long way, of course, from adequate response to the challenge of how we enable students eventually to assess their own socialization. But it does acknowledge my commitment to the idea that creating such an ability must be a part of education.

I am convinced that we must create new communities for today -- or devise other means for somehow meeting the individual and social needs they satisfy. What makes response so difficult is that other considerations of major import must also be satisfied. Yet we must find ways to respond to the *multiple* requisites of human wellbeing, instead of continuing to address one set of these at prohibitive cost to another. Perhaps we might begin by going back to Buber's interesting suggestion that we haven't got the antonyms straight: The opposite of freedom, he proposed, is not compulsion but communion. "At the opposite pole of being compelled ... there does not stand being free of destiny or nature or ... [others] ... but to commune and covenant with them."[46] It seems worth considering.

Endnotes

[1] Joseph K. Hart, Education in the Humane Community. New York: Harper, 1951.

[2] Fred M. Newmann and Donald W. Oliver, "Education and Community," Harvard Educational Review, Winter, 1967, pp. 61-106.

[3] *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory.* South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981.

[4] *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

[5] *Reconstructing Public Philosophy.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982.

[6] *The Needs of Strangers.* New York: Viking, 1985.

[7] Robert N. Bellah, Richard Madsen, William M. LSullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven M. Tipton, *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.

[8] "In Pursuit of the Postmodern." Conference on Toward a Post-Modern World, The Center for Process Studies, Santa Barbara, January, 1987. Unpublished manuscript.

[9] *Knowledge and Politics.* New York: Free Press, 1975.

[10] *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for A New Age.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.

[11] See *The Formation of Conscience in An Age of Technology.* The John Dewey Lecture for 1984. Syracuse: The John Dewey Society, 1984.

[12] *Moral Education: Character, Community and Ideals.* Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988.

[13] See "In Pursuit of Wholeness: Moral Development, The Ethics of Care and the Virtue of Philia," *Philosophy of Education, 1984* edited by Emily E. Robertson. (Normal, IL: Philosophy of Education Society, 1985, pp. 63-74; and "Partners in Moral Education: Communities and Their Public Schools." Unpublished manuscript, n.d.

[14] "Competing Conceptions of Community," *Philosophy of Education, 1986* edited by Nicholas C. Burbules (Normal, IL: Philosophy of Education Society, 1987, pp. 287-298.

[15] See Raymond Plant, "Community: Concept, Conception, and Ideology," *Politics and Society,* 8(1), 1978, pp. 79-107; S. I. Benn, "Individuality, Autonomy and Community" in *Community As A Social Ideal* edited by Eugene Kamenka. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982, pp. 43-62; *The Concept of Community: Readings with Interpretations* edited by David W. Minar and Scott Greer. Chicago: Aldine, 1969, especially pp. ix -xii; and Newmann and Oliver, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-68.

[16] *The Quest for Community: A Study in the Ethics of Order and Freedom.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1953, p. 45.

[17] *Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought.* Boston: Little, Brown, 1960, p. 363.

[18] *Loyalty in America* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957, p. 109.

[19] "Existentialism and the Alienation of Man," in *Phenomenology and Existentialism* edited by Edward N. Tee and Maurice Mandelbaum. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967, p. 264.

[20] Jacqueline Scherer, *Contemporary Community: Sociological Illusion or Reality?* London: Tavistock, 1972.

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 119 (emphasis added) and 117.

22 *Escape from Freedom.* New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1941, and *The Sane Society.* New York: Rinehart, 1955.

23 *Childhood and Society.* New York: W. W. Norton, 2nd edition, 1963.

24

25 See "Beyond the Deficit Model in Child and Family Policy," *Teachers College Record,* 81(1), Fall, 1979, pp. 95-104, and *The Ecology of Human Development: Experiences by Nature and Design.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979.

26 Kallen was the quintessential philosophic liberal in his conviction that the individual's life could be divided into public and private spheres, without cost or sacrifice to participation in either. See, e.g., his essay in *Cultural Pluralism and the America Idea: An Essay in Social Philosophy.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1956.

27 Travis Hirschi. *Causes of Delinquency.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969.

28 Green, *op. cit.*

29 *Ibid.,* p. 11.

30 *Horace's Compromise: The Dilemma of the American High School.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1984, pp. 56-57.

31 See James S. Coleman, *The Adolescent Society: The Social Life of the Teenager and Its Impact on Education.* New York: Free Press, 1961.

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44 *Op. cit.*, pp. 131-134.

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